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 Explaining the Qualitative Dimension of 
Consciousness: Prescission Instead of 
Reifi cation 
 MARC  CHAMPAGNE   York University 
 ABSTRACT: This paper suggests that it is largely a want of notional distinctions 
which fosters the “explanatory gap” that has beset the study of consciousness since 
T. Nagel’s revival of the topic. Modifying Ned Block’s controversial claim that we 
should countenance a “phenomenal-consciousness” which exists in its own right, 
we argue that there is a way to recuperate the intuitions he appeals to without en-
gaging in an onerous reifi cation of the facet in question. By renewing with the full 
type/token/tone trichotomy developed by C. S. Peirce, we think the distinctness 
Block (rightly) calls attention to can be seen as stemming not from any separate 
module lurking within the mind, but rather from our ability to prescind  qualities 
from occurrences. 
 RÉSUMÉ : Cet article suggère que «le fossé dans l’explication» qui tracasse la ré-
fl exion sur la conscience depuis le renouveau instauré par T. Nagel est dû en grande 
partie à un défaut de distinctions notionnelles. En modifi ant l’affi rmation controversée 
de Ned Block que nous devrions accepter la présence d’une «conscience-phénoménale» 
ayant une existence propre, nous soutenons qu’il est possible de récupérer les intuitions 
qui sous-tendent cette proposition sans pour autant endosser une trop coûteuse réifi cation 
de la facette en question. En recouvrant la trichotomie complète en « type/token/tone » 
développée par C. S. Peirce, nous croyons que la spécifi cité sur laquelle Block attire 
(avec justesse) l’attention peut être conçue comme découlant non pas d’un quelconque 
module opérant furtivement dans l’esprit, mais bien de notre capacité de préscinder les 
qualités des occurrences. 
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 It’s not hard to see how philosophers have tied themselves into such knots over qua-
lia. They started where anyone with any sense would start: with their strongest and 
clearest intuitions about their own minds. Those intuitions, alas, form a mutually 
self-supporting closed circle of doctrines, imprisoning their imaginations in the Car-
tesian Theater. 
 Daniel C. Dennett,  Consciousness Explained , 1991 
 [I]f we ask what has been the impact of semiotics upon philosophy over the course 
of the 20 th century, to answer anything beyond “marginal” would be an exaggera-
tion. This situation, as I read it, is about to change dramatically. 
 John N. Deely, “The Impact of Semiotics on Philosophy” (paper delivered at the 
fi rst annual homage to Oscar Parland, University of Helsinki, December 1, 2000) 
 Introduction 
 Apparently, it is a little-known fact that the type/token distinction should be 
 threefold ; the notion unwarrantedly left-out being the  tone . Although one could 
seek to redress this harmful omission purely in the name of exegetic fi delity, 
heeding C. S. Peirce’s complete type/token/tone trichotomy can actually help 
current philosophy out of many quagmires. Specifi cally, the notion of tone 
seems tailor-made to explain the qualitative aspect of consciousness. One of 
the leading concerns animating contemporary philosophy of mind is that no 
matter how good a scientifi c account is, it will leave out the feeling of “what 
it’s like” to be conscious. The topic is a particularly hot one at the moment, and 
has grown into an industry of industrious arguments for and against (see for 
example Wright  2008 ). But if the thesis we recommend in this paper is correct, 
much of this effort is misplaced. Unfortunately, we think philosophers of mind 
are grappling with their elusive object of study by means of a notional biparti-
tion fundamentally ill-suited to the task. 
 Our endeavour will be part history of philosophy, part pure philosophy, 
and—hopefully—part future of philosophy as well. We shall look back at the 
past with a critical eye, identify a missed opportunity, and present a remedia-
tion of this situation that (among other benefi ts) points the way to a better 
theoretical understanding of conscious life. We will begin by recapping in ge-
neric form a common contemporary take on the mind-body problem (section 
1). In an effort to recover some lost insights that might have important reper-
cussions for that debate, we will outline the historical thrust animating Peirce’s 
work (section 2), and then present in an abstract fashion the categorial schema 
which undergirds his type/token/tone distinction (section 3). With this two-
pronged diachronic-synchronic retrieval in place, we will stake out how pre-
scission might offer a better way to account for qualia (section 4). As a case 
study on the benefi ts of this conception, we will analyze Ned Block’s contro-
versial ideas about “phenomenal-consciousness” (section 5), and see whether 
they might profi t from being reformulated in terms of the complete trichotomy 
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previously canvassed (section 6). Although this article is intended mainly as a 
contribution intersecting semiotics and philosophy of mind, we will end by 
addressing some likely metaphysical concerns (section 7). 
 Our goal throughout will be not to corner the reader into some argumenta-
tive “clincher” aggressively forcing her to adopt a given thesis, but rather to lay 
out an alternative way of “picturing” a particularly troublesome aspect of the 
cognitive situation. The issue of whether to take up a certain perspective in-
stead of another is what Rudolf Carnap would have called an “external” ques-
tion. This doesn’t mean, however, that there is no fact of the matter or that the 
choice is wholly unconstrained; it just means people are always free to choose. 
Now fecundity is surely a factor in such decisions, as is long-term promise. But 
primitive proclivities are undoubtedly strong determinants as well, and can 
sometimes issue vetoes in the face of more rational considerations. One would 
hope, however, that reigning intuitions can eventually be exchanged for better 
ones, if there is a genuine openness to the prospect. Such a project is admit-
tedly ambitious—some would no doubt say exceedingly so. Still, it is this op-
timistic assumption which has driven our bid. 
 1. What it’s like 
 Very few theorists drawn to the study of consciousness demonstrate much incli-
nation for historical matters. That is understandable enough. After all, the seem-
ingly intractable mysteries of subjective experience are arguably as far as one 
can get from publicly-observable events long past. Perhaps this explains why, in 
spite of the fact that pretty much everyone agrees that the mind-body problem 
as we know it essentially begins with the refl ections of Descartes, few theorists 
actually consider the question from such a wide historical angle. As we shall see 
in the next section, this is not without its consequences. Be that as it may, most 
contemporary accounts of the debate over the nature of consciousness tend to 
adopt a more proximate starting point. So that’s where we’ll start too. 
 A fi tting moment in this regard (to choose but one notable landmark) is 
Thomas Nagel’s  1974 essay “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” As Paul Churchland 
writes, “Nagel’s compact argument is a prominent fl ag around which much 
antireductive opinion has rallied” (1996, p. 196). Indeed, the paper deserves 
mention for the manner in which it defi antly challenged the then-prevalent 
“wave of reductionist euphoria” (Nagel [ 1974 ] 1997, p. 519). 1 But Nagel’s 
polemic was no mere curiosity, and went on to fi nd a wider audience (and con-
tribute to a weakening of its opponents) precisely because it gave voice to a 
compelling intuition most feel should be binding for explanations of conscious-
ness generally. If Frege’s militant anti-psychologism marked the beginning 
of a long period of disrepute for the very idea of consciousness in many 
philosophical circles, Nagel’s work heralded a resurgence of interest in the 
topic. Such a return was in all likelihood inevitable, and the central merit of 
Nagel’s paper is that it craftily goaded that all-too-human trait, curiosity. As 
Gary Gutting remarks, “Those with strong naturalist inclinations are free to 
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give up thinking about issues that do not admit of rigorous empirical treatment. 
But doing so will not eliminate the body of traditionally philosophical issues 
that cannot be so treated, nor the general human need to engage such issues” 
(1998, p. 11). Although the vocabulary itself was (and remains) rather coarse, 
Nagel’s original idea of an elusive “what it’s like” dimension proper to con-
scious life captured an important aspect that is seemingly left out by most 
theoretical accounts. 
 By its very nature, the idea Nagel gestured at makes for a very slippery ob-
ject of discourse. Colin McGinn, for instance, borrows the biological perspec-
tive adopted by Nagel and turns it on its head. We shall never know what it’s 
like to be a bat, Nagel argued, because as life forms we simply shall never be 
bats. McGinn basically accepts this argument, but then gives it a refl exive 
twist. On this view, our humanity may give us enough insight into ourselves to 
have an intuitive sense that there is something “it is like” for us to be the con-
scious beings we are; however, that same humanity prevents our inquiries from 
attaining a robust theoretical comprehension of this qualitative facet. As a re-
sult, McGinn suggests that just “as traditional theologians found themselves 
conceding cognitive closure with respect to certain of the properties of God, so 
we should look seriously at the idea that the mind-body problem brings us 
bang up against the limits of our capacity to understand the world” ([1989] 
1997, p. 532). If this turns out to be correct and the worries which are typically 
brought on by the study of consciousness are fundamentally the product of an 
insurmountable impediment, then it is diffi cult to see what theorists could do 
about that fact—save commit themselves to some sort of methodological em-
bargo on all things subjective. For those who believe the diffi culties at hand are 
of this nature, such renunciation is not an option, but a  fait accompli . 
 That strategy would of course reprise the general leitmotif of most twenti-
eth-century Anglo-American philosophizing about consciousness, human or 
otherwise. Such resignation notwithstanding, 2 it seems right to acknowledge 
that despite its relative remoteness from the standpoint of theory, each of us 
knows intimately what it’s like to enjoy conscious experience. Fully aware of 
how much explanation-worthy material is left behind when we refuse to tackle 
the issue of “what it’s like” for us to be the sorts of beings we are, 3 Nagel’s 
essay thus made it a point to push for a more hopeful gloss of the situation, 
provocatively spurring the troops to action, as it were. For it could very well be 
that the diffi culties which accompany inquiries into the “what it’s like” side of 
consciousness are  epistemological . If this is so, then it seems more reasonable 
to hope that the diffi culties can indeed be overcome—if only through an ardu-
ous re-conceptualization of our basic assumptions. 
 As Nagel cleverly points out, we would likely scoff at a Martian race’s con-
tention that their (supposedly exhaustive) reductionist account of our species 
shows our conscious experiences to be illusory: “We know they would be 
wrong to draw such a skeptical conclusion because we know what it is like to 
be us” ([1974] 1997, p. 521). Truth be told, we generally scoff at humans too 
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when they make that remarkable claim. In any event, such a privileged insight 
provides the theorist with a point of entry to exploit; thereby reviving hopes 
that a rigorous solution to the diffi culties at hand, no matter how elusive, might 
be in the offi ng. In fact, Nagel underscored that while this qualitative aspect of 
our cognitive lives “includes an enormous amount of variation and complexity, 
and while we do not possess the vocabulary to describe it adequately, its sub-
jective character is  highly specifi c , and in some respects  describable in terms 
that can be understood only by creatures like us” (ibid.; our emphasis). 
 Nagel’s work thus left subsequent Anglo-American philosophizing in a pe-
culiar situation. On the one hand, it contributed to a revival of interest in the 
question of “what it’s like” to be conscious, adding enough of a biological-
 cum -cognitive twist to the standard mind-body problem to make it palatable 
again. But while Nagel refused to neatly segregate the two aspects into incom-
mensurate domains, he vividly underscored the epistemological diffi culties 
that await any attempt at bridging the apparent divide, stressing that while 
“[p]erhaps a theoretical form can be devised for the purpose, . . . such a solution, 
if it exists, lies in the distant intellectual future” (Nagel [ 1974] 1997, p. 519). 
This prompts McGinn to remark that “[d]espite his reputation for pessimism 
over the mind-body problem, a careful reading of Nagel reveals an optimistic 
strain in his thought” ([1989] 1997, p. 540 n. 9). While Nagel himself was 
reticent to speculate about what an adequate account of consciousness would 
look like, there was indeed something prophetic in the way he chose to con-
clude his classic paper:
 At present we are completely unequipped to think about the subjective character of 
experience without relying on the imagination—without taking up the point of view 
of the experiential subject.  This should be regarded as a challenge to form new con-
cepts and devise a new method — an objective phenomenology not dependent on em-
pathy or the imagination .  (Nagel [ 1974] 1997, p. 525; our emphasis) 
 What we want to do now is try and show that one need not look to the “dis-
tant intellectual future” to fi nd the “objective phenomenology” Nagel called 
for. Specifi cally, we believe the materials needed to assemble such a robust 
perspective already exist in semiotics. As we shall see shortly, not only does 
that tradition benefi t from theoretical foundations that  pre-date the quagmire 
Descartes bequeathed philosophical modernity, but its quasi-logical organon 
is perfectly suited to answer Nagel’s central desideratum, namely to “think 
about the subjective character of experience . . . without taking up the point of 
view of the experiential subject” (ibid.). Granted, one must be on guard against 
falling prey to a facile nostalgia which “holds that all major problems have 
already been solved—or, at least, that a framework for the solution has been 
provided—by some great philosopher of the past” (Gutting  1998 , pp. 12 n. 5ff). 
But when the facts indeed speak to the availability of pre-existing materials, 
one must be careful not to turn a blind eye to such resources. Let us then go 
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back further in time than the contemporary starting point we provisionally 
adopted. 
 2. Recovering a discarded patrimony 
 The day a rebellious young René Descartes walked out the door of the Jesuit 
college of La Flèche for the last time, we all did. Given that the Frenchman’s 
once-eccentric grievances with scholastic philosophy went on to shape the 
landscape of discursive acceptability for centuries to come, it is something of 
an irony that the thinker who would go on to challenge  that orthodoxy would 
also turn out to be a freethinking iconoclast. Indeed, some time in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, a scientist and mathematician by the name of 
Charles Sanders Peirce, gripped as he was by an unshakeable conviction in the 
powers of logic ever since he read Richard Whatley’s  Elements of Logic in his 
youth, took it upon himself to engage in a detailed study of that discipline’s 
underpinnings (see Brent  1998 , p. 48). That lifelong project would eventually 
lead him to breach the methodological imperative that had basically defi ned 
the modern mindset since Descartes: “Thou shalt not learn from the Latins”—
to borrow John Deely’s acerbic but telling characterization in his monumental 
 Four Ages of Understanding (2001, p. 613). As Deely recounts:
 From Scotus in particular, but also from Fonseca and the Conimbricenses, [Peirce] 
picked up the trail of the sign. He was never able to follow it as far as the text of 
Poinsot.… Nonetheless, what he picked up from the later Latins was more than 
enough to convince him that the way of signs, however buried in the underbrush it 
had become since the moderns made the mistake of going the way of ideas instead, 
was the road to the future. (ibid.) 
 Just as Paul Churchland ( 1988) wants his own brand of “eliminativism” to 
be distinguished from the more subdued “reductionism” advocated by other 
scientifi cally-minded naturalists, so it is more accurate to say that the semiotic 
inquiry taken up by Peirce is not “anti-Cartesian” but rather  non -Cartesian. 
Such a characterization would seem to hold not only theoretically but histori-
cally as well. Historically, the most succinct defi nition of the sign is the scho-
lastic “ Aliquid stat pro aliquo ”—literally “Something stands for something 
else;” a defi nition which, as stated, does not prejudge whether the relation at 
hand is conventional or natural. Although the neutrality implicit in this defi ni-
tion went on to fi nd its most explicit expression only in the seventeenth century 
with John Poinsot’s  Tractatus de Signis ([1632] 2009), 4 the generic medieval 
formula dates back to Augustine, a pivotal fi gure whose synoptic sensitivities 
led “to the fi rst construction in the history of Western thought that deserves to 
be called semiotic” (Todorov  1992 , pp. 56-57). 5 
 Striving to further develop these radically non-Cartesian conceptions, Peirce 
took the Latin notion of  signum to a new level of theoretical sophistication. In 
the course of his studies, Peirce came to hold in particularly high regard the 
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writings of John Duns Scotus (see Boler  1963 ), a Franciscan philosopher and 
theologian whose nuanced doctrines merited him the moniker “the Subtle Doc-
tor.” As he explained,
 The works of Duns Scotus have strongly infl uenced me. If his logic and metaphysics, 
not slavishly worshipped, but torn away from its medievalism, be adapted to modern 
culture, under continual wholesome reminders of nominalistic criticisms, I am con-
vinced that it will go far toward supplying the philosophy which is best to harmonize 
with physical science. (Peirce  1931 -58, vol. 1, para. 6) 
 Central to Scotus’ position was a specifi c sort of separation which—as the 
scholastic catchphrase goes—is “more than nominal but less than real.” Peter 
King handily summarizes the notion as follows: “The core intuition behind 
Scotus’s formal distinction is, roughly, that  existential inseparability does not 
entail identity in defi nition , backed up by the conviction that this is a fact 
about the way things are rather than how we conceive of them” (in Williams 
 2003 , p. 22; our emphasis). The intellectual setting that spawned this distinc-
tion by Scotus was originally theological, being part of a concerted argumen-
tative defence (from early-Christian times onward) against accusations of 
polytheism:
 How can one reconcile the doctrine of the Trinity with a belief in the unity and sim-
plicity of God? . . . The problems posed by the Trinity supplied the impetus for the 
development of the distinction…. Of course, it was not the  only fi eld of application, 
and the formal distinction came to be invoked in solving a host of purely philo-
sophical problems.  (Jordan  1984 , p. 1) 
 As it turns out, religious controversies begot a technical arsenal perfectly 
suited to tackle the study of signs. Indeed, one of Peirce’s most important con-
tributions to semiotic theory was his Scotus-inspired realization that, if one 
wants to rigorously and systematically unpack all that is implied by the mis-
leadingly obvious notion of “sign,” then one must recognize that every sign 
manifests both an unbreakable  unity (as a sign whose signifi cance is transpar-
ently given “in a fl ash,” as it were) and a  multiplicity (as a “step-by-step” pas-
sage from a sign-vehicle to that which it re-presents). Construing any of the 
components that go into making representation possible as things somehow 
capable of existing without the collaboration of the others may not obliterate 
them metaphysically, but it  eo ipso robs them all of the very signifi cance that 
allows them to serve useful cognitive functions. Thus, if we dissect a sign any 
further and start reifying the various parts we have uncovered, we effectively 
destroy what we wanted to study in the fi rst place, and ensure that these no 
longer have any representational value.  Mutatis mutandis , construing the sign 
as some airtight atom which refl ective thought cannot penetrate would drain all 
the properties that make it a sign. 
152 Dialogue
 Peirce fi rst presented his crucial thesis to the  American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences in 1867, in a paper titled “On a New List of Categories.” By no means 
the most mature of his papers (there is for instance a lingering commitment to 
“substance” that will be pruned soon thereafter), that curt text nevertheless an-
nounced to the modern world a rich but forgotten way of approaching some 
perennial questions of philosophy.
 Exclusive attention consists in a defi nite conception or supposition of one part of an 
object, without any supposition of the other. Abstraction or prescision 6 ought to be 
carefully distinguished from two other modes of mental separation, which may be 
termed discrimination and dissociation. Discrimination has to do merely with the 
essenses of terms, and only draws a distinction in meaning. Dissociation is that sepa-
ration which, in the absence of a constant association, is permitted by the law of as-
sociation of images. It is the consciousness of one thing, without the necessary 
simultaneous consciousness of the other.  Abstraction or prescision, therefore, sup-
poses a greater separation than discrimination, but a less separation than dissocia-
tion . (Peirce 1992, pp. 2-3, our emphasis; see also 1931-58, vol. 1, para. 353; as well 
as vol. 2, para. 428) 
 Cary Spinks notes that “prescission is a diffi cult concept, but it is one of the 
most powerful developed by Peirce and also one of the few which he keeps 
throughout his life work” (1991, p. 23). 
 At the time though, Peirce did not conceive of his endeavours as semiotic 
per se, instead nursing an ill-fated hope that his discoveries would be adopted 
by mainstream philosophy. Be that as it may, the notion of tone he would even-
tually develop is intricately tied to the categorial framework uncovered by pre-
scission. A good way to explain this would be to liken semiotics to geometry. 
While one would be hard-pressed to fi nd in the natural world a line with no 
girth or a point with no extension whatever, we nevertheless have the ability to 
rigorously decompose any three-dimensional space and manipulate the dimen-
sions it subsumes. The organization in such a case is not cardinal, but  ordinal : 
nothing in a singular point entails a line or a volume, but the very notion of 
volume logically implies the line and the point. The geometrical dimensions, 
we could say, do not lie next to each other, but are instead like Russian dolls 
nested in one another. Semiotics is articulated around a similar insight. As 
Peirce showed, any representation perforce involves a genuinely  triadic rela-
tion that cannot be sundered; that is, one which cannot be reduced to the dyadic 
or the monadic on pain of no longer representing. In order to be meaningful, 
something (monadic quality) must stand for (dyadic relation) something else 
and be taken (triadic interpretation) as so standing. 7 Nevertheless, we can break 
these three dimensions down and recognize the specifi c role of each in any 
bona fi de representation. 
 Peirce died in 1914, his failure to secure a place within the academic estab-
lishment during his lifetime (see Brent  1998 ) effectively bequeathing to future 
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generations the laborious task of understanding his massive body of unpub-
lished writings. Thus, outside of a handful of infl uential papers on pragmatism 
written mainly in the 1870s (which he eventually repudiated), 8 his later thought 
remained largely unknown. Peircean scholar Joseph Ransdell recounts that,
 As regards Peirce’s semiotic in particular, hardly anybody had paid any attention to 
it at all—it is clear from something Dewey says in his correspondence with Bentley 
that, prior to the publication of Morris’s [1938] article on the foundations of the 
theory of signs, not even he had previously paid any real attention to that aspect of 
Peirce’s thought…. At most, the term “semiotic” was thought of as referring to a 
crackpot scheme for classifying things called “signs” which nobody in philosophy 
had any interest in to begin with....  (in Deledalle  2001 , p. 220) 
 This unfortunate ignorance is the more lamentable for the fact that many of 
Peirce’s mature ideas were in principle available shortly after the First World 
War. His extensive correspondence with Victoria Lady Welby (Hardwick 
 1977 ; see also Peirce 1998, pp. 477-491), which dealt chiefl y with semiotics, 
was circulated in Europe and sent to prominent intellectual fi gures (including 
Bertrand Russell). His letters eventually reached C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, 
who published choice excerpts of them in a trailblazing appendix to their classic 
 The Meaning of Meaning ([1923] 1989, pp. 279-290). The philosopher of 
mathematics Frank Ramsey, who collaborated with Ogden in translating 
 Wittgenstein’s  Tractatus , came to know of Peirce’s ideas through this transi-
tive connection. By 1923, we fi nd Ramsey arguing in a review that the Vien-
nese thinker would have benefi ted greatly from a familiarity with “two words 
used by C. S. Peirce,” namely “type” and “token” (Ramsey  1923 , p. 468). 
Through a precarious chain of iterated interpretations, some of Peirce’s 
most important semiotic notions had found their way out of the secluded 
Pennsylvania home whence they were spawned. More than that, they were 
being broadcast in a very prominent forum, by a respected (if still emerging) 
Cambridge scholar, during the formative years of the analytic movement, 
in discussing what was to become one of its most important founding texts. 
People took notice. 
 Regrettably, what could have been a momentous occasion to connect with 
key non-modern conceptions was reduced in the twentieth century to no 
more than a newfangled jargon in which to reprise some rather stale schemes. 
Such is the importance of the number three in semiotics that Peirce once 
wondered whether he was not in the grips of some gratuitous fascination with 
triadic conceptions. 9 It should have been apparent, then, that something had 
gone seriously wrong when the Peircean notions of “type” and “token” sur-
faced with growing frequency in the philosophic literature. The climax of 
this tale is somewhat anti-climactic: by the time anybody realized that this 
famous notional duo was in fact supposed to be a  trio , the error had been 
fully committed. 
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 3. Tone-deaf no more 
 The absence we want to call attention to is effectively compounded by the 
prominent visibility of its counterparts. For instance, we fi nd D. M. Armstrong, 
a well-known adherent to the materialist wing of the reductionist program in 
philosophy of mind, framing the problem of universals in terms of the type/
token distinction developed by “the great U.S. nineteenth-century philosopher, 
C. S. Peirce” (Armstrong  1989 , p. 1). 10 As part of his introduction, Armstrong 
produces a box within which one fi nds the word “THE” inscribed twice, and 
continues: “Peirce would have said that there were two tokens of the one type” 
(ibid., p. 2). This characterization, though not inaccurate, is grossly incomplete. 
If Peirce’s name is to be invoked and his nomenclature employed, then 
it should be remembered that the distinction he developed is in fact  tripartite , 
the neglected party being the  tone . 
 Peirce did not discover the type/token distinction in the sense in which it is 
currently used. Plato did that. So the terms “type” and “token” aren’t fancy 
ways to restate the age-old distinction between universals and particulars, re-
spectively. Given such a hasty reading, it is only normal that the tone should 
have fallen by the wayside. For the thinker intimately familiar with the long-
standing debate between realism and nominalism, Peirce’s talk of the tone can 
appear as something of a conceptual anomaly, a quirk that can be all-too-easily 
dismissed. John Boler notes that quality is “certainly the least clear of the 
 categories, and the one that receives the least attention” (1963, p. 123). It is 
the latter part of this statement which accounts for the former. 
 Peirce’s type/token/tone trichotomy—resting as it does on a fi ne-grained 
distinction of distinctions—was ostensibly too subtle. As a result, it has basi-
cally been denatured in the last century to bring it into conformity with reign-
ing (dualist) expectations. However, the foundations which underpin these 
notions are not beholden to any standard metaphysical outlook. “How far are 
the basic categories of Peirce’s phenomenology either particulars or univer-
sals? In describing Firstnesses as qualities of feeling Peirce never makes their 
status plain in terms of this disjunction. All he requests is the disregard of the 
question of reality and of connections with other phenomena” (Spiegelberg 
 1981 , pp. 35-36). Indeed, it is important to keep in mind that the complete 
tripartition is not arrived at by speculation over “what there is.” The distinction 
is through and through logical: “In Peirce’s semiotic the type/token/tone 
(legisign/sinsign/qualisign) 11 trichotomy is based on the idea that a given 
entity, assumed to be a sign, can be regarded in respect to any or all of three 
types of properties it has—monadic, dyadic, triadic (i.e., one-term, two-term, 
three-term)—depending upon the analytical needs in some concrete semiotic 
inquiry” (Sebeok  1994 , p. 1130). 
 Prescission is a particularly crucial tool for semiotics, given that a sign is 
essentially characterized not by any specifi c material status but by a general 
relational structure. 
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 A  Sign , or  Representamen , is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation 
to a Second, called its  Object , as to be capable of determining a Third, called its  In-
terpretant , to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to 
the same Object. The triadic relation is  genuine , that is its three members are bound 
together by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations. 
 (Peirce 1998, pp. 272-273; see also Posner, Robering and Sebeok  1997 , p. 4) 
 If what we have in view is the whole interaction, then we are at the level of 
what Peirce called Thirdness, because we are considering all three parties in-
volved. In such a case, we have a relation between two relata grasped  as a rela-
tion by some third thing beyond it. This is usually the level of interest, 
especially when one is studying some particular cultural or natural instance of 
sign-use. But if our goal is a philosophical analysis of the representational 
structure itself, we may want to go further. If we now suppose this relation 
between two relata as it would be without any further recognition of it as a 
relation, we are dealing with Secondness. Two and only two things are in-
volved, so we’ve effectively left the realm of intelligibility and entered that of 
brute contiguity (see Champagne forthcoming b). Prescinding still further, we 
may also want to suppose one of the relata without its entering into any rela-
tion with another. Peirce writes: “[T]he idea of a quality is the idea of a phe-
nomenon or partial phenomenon considered as a monad, without reference to 
its parts or components and without reference to anything else” (1931-58, vol. 1, 
para. 424). If we do this, we eliminate whatever alterity allowed that unary 
relata (the term now becomes a misnomer) to have a “contour.” Thus, when we 
prescind relation away so as to consider only that which is related, we may no 
longer think of the resultant tone as we do a token, since doing so would re-
quire us to delimit it in some fashion and ascend back to Secondness. It isn’t 
that what we began studying suddenly vanishes from existence proper; the 
analysis is one in thought and leaves our initial object of study untouched. But 
if we choose to prescind all the way, Firstness is as far as we can go, and we 
obtain a pure quality that  could be actualized but isn’t. 12 
 In order to give an overview of the sorts of distinctions afforded by prescis-
sion, let us consider a fairly straightforward example (taken from Sebeok  1994 , 
p. 1130; adapted from Peirce  1931 -58, vol. 2, para. 230):
 Because of his long  fast , he was too weak to stand  fast or hold  fast or even to run 
 fast . 
 Through the lens of prescission, the word “fast” appears three times as type, 
four times as token, and once as tone. The idea of token is perhaps the easiest 
to compass. To be a token is to be an occurrence, something that has a discrete 
spatial and temporal location. In contrast, neither the type nor the tone is bound 
by such immanence. The tone is a quality—considered prior to its occurrence 
as token. If we prescind, we can isolate the qualitative feature that is common 
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to the tokens “fast” and “fast.” To be sure, this quality—in this case a confi gura-
tion of marks—is very much  there as constitutive of each token, and there is no 
way for us to get to a “suchness” except through a “thisness.” But the tone itself 
enjoys a priority which enables us to logically isolate it while disregarding its 
numerically distinct manifestations. It is, Peirce would say, a First. The tone 
may be the qualitative commonality which runs beneath various tokens, but its 
position in the triadic order prevents it from accounting for the specifi c manner 
in which such tokens appear de facto. This last task belongs to the type. Like the 
tone, the type manifests a certain transcendence—albeit in virtue of a very dif-
ferent rationale. To be a type is to be a generality that legislates the occurrence 
of tokens. One type of “fast” applies the adjective to objects that are quick in 
motion, whereas another type pertains to things that are fi rmly fi xed. 13 
 A handy summary of these tenets would be this well-known but often trun-
cated 14 passage from Peirce:
 There will ordinarily be about twenty  the ’s on a page, and of course they count as 
twenty words. In another sense of the word “word,” however, there is but one word 
“the” in the English language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly 
on a page or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or Single 
event. It does not exist; it only determines things that do exist. Such a defi nitely sig-
nifi cant Form, I propose to term a  Type . A Single event which happens once and 
whose identity is limited to that one happening . . . such as this or that word on a 
single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to call a  Token . 
 An indefi nite signifi cant character such as a tone of voice can neither be called a 
Type nor a Token . I propose to call such a Sign a  Tone. (Peirce  1931 -58, vol. 4, para. 
537; our emphasis) 
 Returning to our example, we can say that “fast” is there three times when we 
consider it as a law-like regularity, four times when we consider it as a singular 
occurrence, and once when we consider it as pure quality. As an ordinal First, 
“fast” is merely a potentiality, a “something” that  could be employed to stand 
for something else (but doesn’t have to be). In sharp contrast with the type, it 
is very much possible that a word qua tone “should lie visibly on a page or be 
heard in any voice” (ibid.). If and when such a quality  occurs , “fast” is a Sec-
ond. To the extent that such an occurrence is not a singleton, but appears re-
peatedly in accordance with some sort of rationale that is not merely haphazard 
(e.g., a habit), “fast” is a Third. And even if it makes little sense to think of 
“fast” as existing in only one of these respects, be it a quality that never occurs 
or a law that never manifests itself, prescission allows us to carefully distin-
guish anything that is intelligible along these three axes. 
 Clearly, our chosen illustration, no matter how didactic, has its limitations: 
one is not likely going to make much of a dent on any problem regarding 
consciousness if one persists in obtusely equating the tone with “a sound or 
confi guration of marks”—a legitimate but by no means exhaustive case. 15 The 
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moral, in sum, is that one should impose no more restrictions on the tone than 
on the token and type—a popular pair also explained by an appeal to “words” 
(see Guttenplan  1995 , pp. 596-597) yet routinely mobilized with great profi t in 
non-linguistic domains. In this respect, however novel our proposal may be, it 
capitalizes on an already respectable move. 
 While much more could be said about the interrelation which binds together 
Peirce’s full semiotic trichotomy, 16 the main thing which concerns us is the fact 
that prescission can be deployed without assuming that anything it uncovers 
could truly stand on its own, that is, without the involvement of those other 
aspects deliberately disregarded. As David Savan explains,
 The  occurrence of a quality in space and time renders the quality at least in some 
measure a sinsign [i.e., token].... Similarly, the sinsign is always, to some degree, a 
replica of a legisign [i.e., type].... And a legisign, like a qualisign [i.e., tone], can not 
be encountered as such in experience.... What this means is that the empirical student 
of semiotics must use Peirce’s trichotomy (if he uses it at all) as an analytical tool, by 
means of which to distinguish three different aspects of semiosis.... Empirically, no 
sign belongs exclusively to one of these classes. This is not to deny the value of the 
distinction, or the potential value for empirical research. It is only a caution against 
a threatening misunderstanding. (1987, pp. 23-24) 
 When we commit ourselves to carefully distinguishing what can and cannot 
be supposed independently of other suppositions, we engage in an exercise of 
epistemological hairsplitting that can go still deeper than the level of particular 
individuals. Just as “P” implies “possible that P” but not the other way round, 
the token asymmetrically implies the tone. As Peirce states: “Prescission is not 
a reciprocal process” (1992, p. 3). Yet, strictly speaking, a merely “possible 
that P” without any kind of actuality would be ineffable. To the extent we con-
sider something (anything) absolutely  in itself without regard to its actual oc-
currence, we have willingly robbed ourselves of any basis that could have 
allowed the situation to be more than a mere potentiality. So it becomes a fal-
lacy of sorts to lose sight of this and construe the resultant quality as some 
distinct token. Since the error consists in taking a “doctored” product of our 
thinking to be a “discovered” fact independent of that intervention, it is apt to 
call it a  reifi cation . 
 Peirce himself did not address the mind-body problem directly—at least not 
in the sense in which it is currently understood. 17 Nevertheless, we believe 
prescission and the notion of tone he left us points the way to a more satisfac-
tory theoretical account of “what it’s like” to enjoy conscious experience. Let 
us now explore that possibility. 
 4. A fork in the road 
 Twentieth-century philosophy ignored not only a full third of Peirce’s trichot-
omy, but—perhaps more importantly—its very rationale. Nevertheless, as a 
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result of those semiotic notions that  did manage to seep through (albeit in dis-
torted form), today’s philosophers of mind are unlikely to make a more oner-
ous ontological commitment without explicitly recognizing that they are doing 
as much—it’s rather hard, for instance, to endorse “type-type identity” without 
also being recognized as doing so and being given the appropriate label. 
Crucial avenues are routinely lost, however, due to the fact that, in this climate, 
reifi cation of the  tone can happen without anybody even noticing the move. 
We submit that this is exactly what has happened in the case of phenomenal 
qualia. 
 There are many thought-experiments on the market which attempt, with 
various degrees of success, to prove that consciousness indeed comprises an 
irreducibly qualitative dimension. Although he has since sought to distance 
himself from the claims he once made, Frank Jackson’s “knowledge argument” 
remains one of the more vivid examples. Jackson ([ 1986 ] 1997) invites us to 
consider a neuroscientist who, upon being raised in a strictly black and white 
setting since birth, is allowed for the fi rst time to emerge from her isolated 
confi nes and step into a fully-coloured environment. Even if she had mastered 
a comprehensive physical and functional account of colour prior to that virgin 
exposure, her new experiences would likely give her an  additional insight—a 
visceral acquaintance, if you will—into “what it’s like” to actually see  red . 
This is by no means the only way to bring out the qualitative dimension of 
consciousness. Kripke ([ 1980 ] 1997), for instance, offers another, more techni-
cal, argument which turns on considerations of modality. In any case, whoever 
acquiesces to the common distinction such arguments are intended to convey 
is eventually faced with the following question: What might this phenomenal 
experience be which seems to escape conventional explanations? 18 Whatever 
the terminology, an all-important decision must therefore be made: what sort 
of ontological status should be ascribed to the qualitative features that are ex-
perienced in consciousness? 
 Given a generic commitment to phenomenal qualia, we believe the core al-
ternative is whether one shall  reify or  prescind . Admittedly, even if one has no 
clue what the second disjunct consists in, raising the spectre of reifi cation is 
enough to scare most thinkers into denying that the distinction had any basis to 
begin with. Such a retreat notwithstanding, those who stand fast by their philo-
sophical conviction that there is indeed something “more” to consciousness are 
faced with a crucial fork in the road: 1) does the reality at hand warrant our 
engaging in some measure of “thing-making,” or 2) is the distinction—no mat-
ter how objective—nevertheless insuffi cient to sanction such a reifi cation? Our 
central contention is that, wittingly or not,  the pervasive type/token distinction 
compels one to adopt the fi rst of these disjuncts, whereas semiotics provides 
one with the technical tools needed to comprehensively follow the latter path . 
 At the risk of oversimplifying (we shall here focus on the most essential 
features of the problem), those who think mental life has a qualitative dimen-
sion usually gloss the situation in the following terms: there are  token brain 
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states on one side, there are  token qualia on another side, and the task is to fi nd 
something that would correlate these two seemingly disparate relata. This is 
what has come to be known, appropriately enough, as the “explanatory gap.” 19 
Sometimes the two parties in want of a union are grouped into their respective 
 types . Yet this way of viewing the situation unquestioningly treats qualities like 
pain and red as tokens and/or types. Given the omission we outlined, the idea 
of tone— construed as something irreducible to tokens or types —simply 
doesn’t come up. With no visible alternative, the accepted roster of options 
thus misses a potentially fruitful exit (this situation is summarized in the 
diagram below). 
 Although the schema seeks to relate various programmatic commitments in an 
explicit and informative way, it is by no means intended as an exhaustive sur-
vey of all that could be said (or  not said) on the topic of consciousness. More-
over, the diagram ends where most theoretical inquiries begin. Indeed, the fi ve 
tracts it takes pains to separate each lead to prolifi c research programs that 
rarely attend to their founding suppositions. The bulk of the literature on con-
sciousness—including the explanatory gap—lies to the “East” of the right-
hand arrowheads. Each basic combination of commitments carves out a space 
of intellectual possibilities within which further discussion unfolds. In keeping 
with the mantra that prescission is less than real and more than nominal, we 
could have fi lled the fi nal box leading to the third tract with “Yes, for  epistemo-
logical reasons.” Likewise, the spirit of the second tract can be encapsulated by 
the answer “Yes, for  metaphysical reasons.” This characterization is somewhat 
crude, but it does capture the essence of what’s at stake. 
 In any case, however one wants to describe the basic idea, what matters is 
that, given the current climate, the bifurcation or “fork in the road” which leads 
160 Dialogue
to either reifi cation (path 2) or prescission (path 3) goes pretty much unnoticed. 
As such, thinkers who acquiesce to the thesis that we can indeed hope to study 
qualitative phenomena typically proceed directly from this to a treatment of 
qualia as tokens and/or types. And of course, once this much has been granted, 
the problem of “relating” the disparate classes surfaces with particular inevita-
bility. This is where Peirce’s complete trichotomy has much to offer. The theo-
rist working with a dichotomous palette of types and tokens is inadvertently 
strong-armed by her tacit commitments into the inference that if phenomenal 
qualities are real enough to be  discerned , then they must exist in their own 
right as something genuinely  distinct . But if we accept that prescission allows 
us to robustly differentiate the layers subsumed in triadic relations, the fact that 
we can consider the tone to be logically prior to the token is taken to mean no 
more than that, ontology-wise. 
 In order to elaborate on this alternative way of viewing the situation, we 
want to examine the position defended by Ned Block. His contention that the 
literature on consciousness routinely confl ates the “accessible” and the “phe-
nomenal” has stimulated quite a bit of debate, be it among those who think he 
misconstrues the distinction or among those who think there is simply no dis-
tinction there to confl ate. Not only is Block’s controversial proposal interesting 
in its own right, it provides us with a template whence to better comprehend the 
manner in which “what it’s like” comes to be regarded as “what there is.” As 
we shall see, the insight behind Block’s distinction is basically right-headed, 
but runs into all sorts of problems because it construes qualia as  tokens. 
 5. Carving consciousness at the joints too deeply 
 Rehearsing the widely held sentiment that the notion of consciousness is a 
“mongrel” which clumps together various objects that in fact are (and should 
be conceived as being) distinct, Block has challenged a seemingly innocuous 
inference he deems fundamentally mistaken. Psychological research contains a 
vast array of studies which detail abnormal cases where, for all intents and 
purposes, an affl icted person is missing one or more of the aspect(s) and/or 
faculty(ies) we typically expect consciousness to have (e.g., anything discussed 
in cognitive science that ends with “syndrome”). Faced with these puzzling 
cases, the stock assumption has been that this want of one or more aspect(s) 
and/or faculty(ies) is truly a  want (in kind and not just degree), medical excep-
tions effectively confi rming our starting intuitions about what constitutes a 
fully healthy consciousness. As an upshot, it is held that ascertaining the specif-
ics of an abnormal dearth can better our understanding of consciousness in its 
normal state. This apparently benign line of thought is the “target reasoning” 
Block aims to undermine. 20 With its underlying inference explicitly identifi ed, 
he contends that “[t]hough some variants of this sort of reasoning have merit, 
they are often given more weight than they deserve because of a persistent fal-
lacy involving a confl ation of two very different concepts of  consciousness” 
([1995] 1997, p. 376). In sum, Block believes that while certain mental  faculties 
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and thought-processes can be found wanting in affl icted patients, this does not 
provide a suffi cient basis to infer that the  phenomenal aspect of their conscious 
lives is correspondingly missing (ibid., pp. 397, 407). 
 At the heart of this claim lies a distinction Block thinks is routinely ne-
glected. In fact, as Block explains, “[n]early every article I read on the subject 
by philosophers and psychologists involves some confusion” of the difference 
in question ([1995] 1997, p. 392). In order to put an end to this widespread 
confl ation (or at least make sure it does not go unrecognized), he gives this 
distinction a semi-technical gloss, the functional side being designated “ access -
consciousness” and the qualitative side “ phenomenal -consciousness.” Block 
spends quite bit of time trying to illustrate this proposal, and the specifi cs of his 
many and colourful examples could be debated at length. But the hope seems 
to be that the distinction would be retroactively vindicated by a subsequent 
contention that the aspects distinguished are very likely  mutually-independent , 
in the demanding sense of the term. Indeed, Block thinks empirical data and 
thought-experiments alike suggest that there can be access without phenome-
non ([1995] 1997, pp. 385-386) and phenomenon without access (ibid., pp. 
386-389). 
 Let us consider the fi rst of these situations, where agents would process in-
formation without actually enjoying any phenomenal episode. Block believes 
there is some empirical support for this in the case of “blindsighted” persons 
who cannot see things before them, yet supposedly can have reliable responses 
to these when pressed by an examiner to venture an answer. 21 Referring to the 
information-processing model developed by Daniel Schacter ( 1989) , Block 
([1995] 1997, pp. 377-380) suggests that the generally correct judgements 
(about unseen things) which these affl icted patients perform is made possible 
because they somehow  bypass their “phenomenal-consciousness module” and 
proceed straight to the executive system whose end-product is overt behaviour 
(e.g., decisions, actions, and utterances). That, as it stands, is a very provoca-
tive suggestion. Above and beyond agreeing with our introspective intuitions, 
phenomenal qualia are typically introduced into one’s theoretical picture of the 
mind for the explanatory virtues they offer. Advocates of this dimension usu-
ally hold that physical and functional processes are by themselves unable to 
account for certain classes of events and behaviour patterns which call into 
play phenomenal episodes. On this view, the “what it’s like” side of conscious-
ness alluded to by Nagel is more than just intrinsically fascinating; it actually 
has some theoretical usefulness and, as such, cannot be discarded simply on 
account of its falling short of physicalist expectations. What Block is saying, in 
effect, is that qualia are very real—and that we should think of them as such—
even though it is possible for an agent without access to them to meet the de-
mands of functionalism. 
 The temptation to invoke parsimony is never far behind, and given this 
apparently self-defeating proposal, most philosophers would likely shave 
off Block’s phenomenal-consciousness altogether. Seeing how the case for 
162 Dialogue
 phenomenal experience is already problematic when such subjective episodes 
are held to be a potent aid in cognition, the urge to run one’s account on access-
consciousness only is all the more felt when one sees a prominent defender of 
“phenomenal realism” 22 insist that correct decision-making can obtain even 
when experimental settings confi rm that no such qualitative episodes are avail-
able to a patient. David Chalmers, for instance, voiced such worries:
 [T]here is something very strange about the idea of an “epiphenomenal” P-con-
sciousness module…. The main motivation for epiphenomenalism is surely that ex-
perience seems superfl uous to any information-processing; but Block’s idea suggests 
an implausible epiphenomenalism  within the information-processing story. Indeed, 
if the module has no effect on other processes, then we could lesion it with no exter-
nal change (same reports, even), and no empirical evidence could support the hy-
pothesis. (1997, p. 423) 
 As if this wasn’t infl ammatory enough, Block enjoins us to fathom a  super -
blindsighted person who would declare that “Now I know that there is a hori-
zontal line in my blind fi eld even though I don’t actually see it” and for whom 
visual information “simply pops into his thoughts in the way that solutions to 
problems we’ve been worrying about pop into our thoughts” ([1995] 1997, 
p. 385). These fantastic suggestions are ostensibly meant to be taken with a 
grain of salt (see for example the caveat, ibid., p. 380). But while Block readily 
states that he doesn’t know “whether there are any actual cases of A-consciousness 
without P-consciousness,” he hopes his speculative ruminations will have 
 illustrated the “conceptual possibility” of such cases (ibid., p. 386). 23 
 What we have here, in effect, is the garden-variety “zombie” discussed in 
the cognitive sciences, the hypothetical creature that performs all that we hu-
mans do without enjoying any of the relevant qualitative experiences. But 
Block’s mutual-independence of access and phenomenon has him countenance 
yet another sort of zombie, one who would have the phenomena without hav-
ing access to them—as in the case of a busy person who “hears” but does not 
“notice” the loud drilling noise that has been present near her during an engag-
ing conversation (Block [ 1995] 1997, pp. 386-387). In terms of Schacter’s 
model, this would mean an activation of the phenomenal module that has no 
repercussion upon anything beyond itself, be it access-consciousness (of the 
sort that would prompt the more overt realization that “Wow, that noise is re-
ally loud and/or bothersome”) or the executive system which could trigger re-
actionary behavioural outputs (say, covering one’s ears or moving the 
conversation to another location). Staying true to his distinction, Block argues 
that no matter how inaccessible they may be from the standpoint of informa-
tion-processing, qualia could in fact be present in such a zombie’s phenome-
nal-consciousness module. 24 
 It is usually sound methodology to think that if a posited object does not 
manifest itself in any overt way, this gives us good grounds to conclude that the 
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posit in question does not in fact obtain. Indeed, it seems reasonable to say that 
a rare beast cannot be so rare that no one ever witnesses it; and that one must 
fi rst establish the actual reality of a species before labelling it endangered and 
adopting legislative measures. This, however, is the (purportedly hasty) rea-
soning Block seeks to assail. Although one typically determines the absence of 
an aspect and/or faculty of consciousness by way of a contrast with its manifest 
presence in healthy persons, Block claims that the evidence adduced to sanc-
tion such a move is inconclusive, as it does not fully exclude the possibility 
that the aspect and/or faculty in question might still lurk in an affl icted patient’s 
mind. 
 To be sure, Block recognizes that his distinction makes for some very strange 
and onerous consequences, notably the two zombies just sketched. But before 
we raise the razor of parsimony, he asks us to consider whether the view of 
consciousness we adopt takes due consideration of experiments that suppos-
edly show patients reliably executing various cognitive tasks without recourse 
to the sort of phenomenal resources healthy persons would typically marshal. 25 
As Levine rightfully says: “[T]o the extent that there is an element in our con-
cept of qualitative character that is not captured by features of its causal role, 
to that extent it will escape the explanatory net of a physicalistic reduction” 
([1993] 1997, p. 553). The question of course is whether this is actually the 
case—that is, if and to what extent qualia indeed merit explanatory attention in 
their own right. 
 Convinced by the sorts of arguments presented by Block, Nagel, Jackson, 
and others, some have proceeded to develop positive theories that try to ac-
count for this elusive feature of mind. Other thinkers, unimpressed by Block’s 
distinction or uncomfortable with the thorny methodological issues that are 
raised when one countenances a (potentially inaccessible) phenomenal-con-
sciousness “module,” have simply followed through with the reductionist pro-
gram, unabated. Still others have tried to make sense of the fairly strong 
intuitions Block appeals to by recasting them in a more reductionist-friendly 
mould. In the fi nal tally, although Block has not garnered many outspoken 
adherents, his proposed distinction has come to be seen as “very useful,” and 
most theorists would likely agree with Chalmers that, at the very least, “[t]here 
is clearly a  conceptual distinction here” (1997, p. 421; emphasis in original). 
The ensuing dilemma, then, is how best to handle a “conceptual” distinction 
which does not seem to latch onto things that are real in the demanding sense, 
but which is nevertheless convincing enough to sustain a fairly stable set of 
descriptions. Barring an outright denial, we can recognize that something tan-
gible is animating those who think the qualitative dimension of consciousness 
is distinct enough to escape standard accounts. 
 Some elaborate theories have suggested, however, that there might be noth-
ing more to it all than this sociological convergence. As one of the most vocal 
(and eclectic) opponents of qualia, Daniel Dennett ( 1991) has famously main-
tained that human consciousness is best understood as a cultural construct of 
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sorts; inasmuch as one would never claim to possess consciousness unless one 
did not acquire the very concept from one’s societal surroundings. Objecting to 
this view, Block states: “Now I hope it is obvious that P-consciousness is not a 
cultural construction. Remember, we are talking about P-consciousness itself, 
not the concept of P-consciousness” ([1995] 1997, p. 394). There are many 
ways to read this statement. 26 For our purposes, we should like to draw atten-
tion to the specious character of Block’s laconic reply. What it amounts to, in 
effect, is the declaration that a certain thing (in this case phenomenal-con-
sciousness) has a full-fl edged existence apart from discourse, since we can talk 
of “the-thing” itself in abstraction from “discourse-on-the-thing.” In our view, 
this sort of reasoning betokens a clear reifi cation—one which runs counter to 
the Scotist insight that we can accurately identify (and intelligibly discuss) a 
feature without it thereby becoming a supplementary “something” existing in 
its own right. 
 Sensing the tensions at hand, Güzeldere makes an insightful remark that 
encapsulates with astonishing clarity the predicament we sought to diagnose in 
the fourth section:
 [C]ould it be that the particular way Block’s distinction carves out phenomenal con-
sciousness, separating it  completely from its causal and functional aspects in accord 
with the ‘segregationist intuition,’ renders its investigation by means of scientifi c 
methods theoretically impossible? Put differently,  could we be painting ourselves 
into a corner by a conceptual commitment to Block’s distinction such that we end up 
with a number of straightforward problems about A-consciousness and a  conjured-up 
“hard problem” of P-consciousness that in principle admits no solution? (1997, 
p. 29; our emphasis) 
 Given that considerable diffi culties confront Block’s “phenomenal realist” po-
sition (and Dennett’s instrumentalism 27 ), we think it would be worthwhile for 
current philosophy to explore an unheeded tract which explicitly centres on a 
separation that is less than real yet more than nominal. Such a framework would 
have the potential of doing justice to Block’s intuitive appeals whilst resisting 
an all-out “segregation” of the mind’s qualitative dimension. Let us then return 
to the fork in the road identifi ed earlier and venture down a new path. 
 6. What it could be like 
 As we saw earlier, one of the central tenets of Peircean semiotics is that the 
very idea of representation, carefully unpacked, presupposes a three-place 
 relation that cannot be sundered; that is, one which cannot be reduced to 
the dyadic or the monadic on pain of no longer representing (see Peirce 1998, 
pp. 272-273, 411). This does not, however, mean that qualia are representa-
tional. Semiotics does not say that a quale represents, but rather that representa-
tion perforce involves a quale—there is no reciprocity (i.e., no monad is a 
triad). This is the crucial feature that is so diffi cult to make sense of when one 
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follows the path of reifi cation, as witnessed by Block’s rather awkward sugges-
tion that access-consciousness is what allows phenomenal-consciousness to 
be “poised” for use ([1995] 1997, p. 387). Addressing this problematic idea, 
Denise Gamble writes: “An ontology of representations is a powerful tool for 
explaining some types of content. But not every internal stimulation or activa-
tion in mentality need be a representation. Is there no other conceptual frame-
work for understanding phenomenology?” (1997, p. 150). There is indeed. 
 Although Peirce draws on a distinct phenomenology (Spiegelberg  1981 , 
pp. 27-50), the notion of the “phenomenal” suggests a “phenomenalism” 
which he as a scientifi c realist found repugnant (see Ransdell 1978). “Repre-
sentations,” from a semiotic point of view, are not a special class of objects 
such that certain (typically  mental ) things inherently  have to represent while 
others can never do so. Much the opposite: the tone emphatically does not 
have to be the ground upon which interpretation pole-vaults to an object. If 
and when it is, then of course it has; and there is no question here of denying 
that all-important service (known as “ renvoi ” in French). But the whole point 
of prescission is that we can recognize quality as an ordinal First in such a 
relation, thereby incorporating into our theoretical picture the idea that a tone 
 can stand for something else  but need not do so . Thus, despite the unbreakable 
(triadic) bond which characterizes any representation, whatever is burdened 
with the logical duty of standing for something else—no matter what it may 
consist in—can be prescinded in such a way as to disregard its employment in 
that capacity. 
 This means that,  pace Block ( 1995 , pp. 33-34), orgasms don’t have to be 
“about” anything. But it also means that if one is led to infer from this “that 
something very pleasing is happening down  there ” (Tye  1995 ), then, to that 
extent, the orgasm is acting as a sign. From a semiotic standpoint, however, 
there is nothing about bodily feelings or sensations that make them more apt to 
serve as bearers of meaning, nor is there anything that bars a particular class 
from doing so. Block’s talk of “mental paint” (1995, pp. 27-29), though 
couched in a mentalistic idiom, at times comes very close to the notion of tone. 
But it always founders because of its assumption (inscribed in the very name) 
that the issue of whether something is or is not a vehicle of representation—of 
whether it stands for something else to something—can somehow be answered 
by studying the nature of the candidate in question. According to the view we 
recommend, that is a thoroughly misguided endeavour. 
 [T]he  being of the sign is the triadic relation itself, not the elements related or struc-
tured according to their respective roles…. The representative element within this 
triadic structure, which we loosely call a “sign,” “in itself” is  not a sign at all , but one 
of the three elements  necessary to the being of a sign , one of the three legs on which 
the sign walks in working its way through the world, and, indeed, the “foremost” leg, 
insofar as it is the leg which takes the direct representative step in carrying a semiosis. 
 (Deely  2005 , pp. 176, 178)  28 
166 Dialogue
 Although the cardinal layers (of which potential quality is the simplest) at 
the heart of Peircean semiotics can provide the philosopher with a substantial 
source of inspiration whence to develop a coherent metaphysical outlook (see 
Champagne  2006 ), our ability to prescind certain features need not entail any 
corresponding profl igacy. The  Dictionnaire de la langue philosophique cites 
the defi nition of “la précision” given by J. B. Bossuet as “l’action que fait notre 
esprit en séparant par la pensée des choses en effet inséparables”—“the act 
which our mind does when it separates by means of thought things that are in 
point of fact inseparable” ( Logique , I, xxii; quoted in Foulquié and Saint-Jean 
 1962 , p. 562; our translation). It is fully consistent, therefore, for one to acqui-
esce to the above distinctions while steadfastly denying that there are 8  fast ’s 
in our earlier example (obtained from adding 3 types + 4 tokens + 1 tone). 
 Block, in contrast, suggests that the fact that we can conceive of a quality not 
accessed in any overt state of consciousness is a strong indication that a dis-
tinct phenomenal-consciousness module might truly exist. Let’s go back to an 
example mentioned earlier and see how he describes the qualia involved:
 [W]e have P-conscious states when we see, hear, smell, taste, and have pains.... Here 
is another reason to believe in P-consciousness without A-consciousness: Suppose 
that you are engaged in intense conversation when suddenly at noon you realize that 
right outside your window, there is—and has been for some time—a pneumatic drill 
digging up the street. You were aware of the noise all along, one might say, but only 
at noon are you  consciously aware of it. That is, you were P-conscious of the noise 
all along, but at noon you are both P-conscious  and A-conscious of it.... Only at noon 
is the content of your representation of the drill  poised for use in rational control of 
action and speech.... The example shows the conceptual distinctness of P-conscious-
ness from A-consciousness and it also puts the burden of proof on anyone who would 
argue that as a matter of empirical fact they come to the same thing. ([1995] 1997, 
pp. 380, 386-387) 
 Stripped to its bare essentials, Block’s argument can be summarized as follows: 
1) Phenomenal-consciousness is conceivable without access-consciousness 
(i.e., the passage above). 2) Access-consciousness is conceivable without phe-
nomenal-consciousness (i.e., the projected case of “super-blindsight”).  Ergo : 
3) We are entitled to distinguish phenomenal-consciousness from access-con-
sciousness. The theorist working with the incomplete type/token distinction 
needs both premises to proceed to the conclusion—which is then glossed as 
proof that qualia exist as tokens. 29 But if we heed the insight that triadic rela-
tions can be decomposed without their involving a multiplicity of distinct ob-
jects, we can proceed straight to the conclusion after the fi rst  premise. 
 Since the mutual-independence upheld by Block is logically posterior to the 
distinction on which it is deployed, one can buy into the distinction without 
endorsing the onerous relational thesis which would have them be mutually 
independent. The debt to Duns Scotus here is readily apparent: existential 
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 inseparability indeed does not entail identity in defi nition. Of course, Scotus 
was not the only philosopher to have grasped this crucial fact. As Joseph Levine 
writes in discussing the problematic entanglements that accompany arguments 
for the full reality of qualia in consciousness: “One cannot infer from a variety 
of modes of access to a variety of facts being accessed” ([1993] 1997, p. 546). 
Semiotics helps to theoretically articulate this stance. The fact that we can 
rigorously prescind a tone from a token is not a suffi cient reason to think that 
it exists in its own right. 
 In short, just as Ramsey suggested that Wittgenstein would have profi ted 
from distinguishing between the type and the token, so we hold that carefully 
heeding the token/tone distinction can lend support to Block’s insightful but 
embattled propositions. Consider for instance the following passage by 
Peirce:
 Among phanerons [Peirce’s name for phenomena] there are certain qualities of feel-
ing, such as the color of magenta, the odor of attar, the sound of a railway whistle, 
the taste of quinine.... I do not mean the sense of actually experiencing these feelings, 
whether primarily or in any memory or imagination. That is something that involves 
these qualities as an element of it. But I mean the qualities themselves which, in 
themselves, are mere may-bes, not necessarily realized....  A quality of feeling can be 
imagined to be without any occurrence, as it seems to me. Its mere may-being gets 
along without any realization at all .... I suppose you will tell me that no such thing 
could be alone in the universe…. But I point out to you that these things are only 
known to us by extraneous experience;  none of them are either seen in the color, 
heard in the sound, or felt in the visceral sensation. Consequently, there can be no 
logical diffi culty in supposing them to be absent , and for my part, I encounter not the 
slightest psychological diffi culty in doing so, either. (1931-58, vol. 1, para. 304-305; 
our emphasis. See also Peirce 1998, p. 150) 
 Prescission teaches us that underneath all the hubbub of thought and discourse 
(and that general “action of signs” which Peirce called “semiosis”), there is the 
tone: a monadic dimension that has the  power to be the qualitative vehicle of 
representation but which in virtue of its ordinal primacy remains serenely ig-
norant of whether it is  actually employed in so raucous an activity (see Peirce 
 1931 -58, vol. 1, para. 422-426). 
 The kinship between Block’s intuitive illustrations and Peirce’s analysis is 
striking. Yet with these two interpretations now in plain sight, would it not be 
preferable to keep intact their common contention that a legitimate distinction 
is at play—all while recognizing that it owes to our ability to “peel off” occur-
rences and glance in an abstract fashion at the qualities they presuppose? By re-
fusing to reify the features it prescinds, such an approach would allow us to 
respect the distinct character of phenomenal experience without turning it into 
a chimera. Going back to the Russian doll metaphor, prescission shows us that 
the distinctness of qualia does not put them  besides mental states, but  in them. 
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On this view,  it is not that access-consciousness and phenomenal-conscious-
ness are tokens of different types; rather, the latter is the tone of the former’s 
tokens . This explains why “A-consciousness and P-consciousness are almost 
always present or absent together” (Block [ 1995] 1997, p. 401). But given that 
tones are not themselves occurrences, this steadfast accompaniment in no way 
means that the qualities at hand somehow “supervene” on the corresponding 
tokens (although we are reluctant to adopt a facile “-ism” for fear that the cru-
cial semiotic interrelation we have striven to explicate might be forgotten, it 
could be said that the situation involves a species of  subsumption ). 
 Try as one might, we believe it is impossible to reproduce or mimic the rela-
tion provided by tract 3 in our earlier diagram with the more onerous resources 
of tract 2. To the extent this is true, then incorporating the full trichotomy cre-
ates a seismic shift in the topography of the debate—a change which might 
spell promise for an inquiry that, by its own admission, has been deadlocked 
before a seemingly unbridgeable chasm. Attentively considering the advan-
tages and disadvantages that come with Block’s infl uential distinction, Chalm-
ers summarizes the issue in three points: “(1) one can imagine access without 
experience and vice versa; (2) access can be observed straightforwardly, 
whereas experience cannot; and, most important, (3) access consciousness 
seems clearly amenable to cognitive explanation, whereas phenomenal con-
sciousness is quite perplexing in this regard” (1997, p. 421). To layer a sum-
mary of our own, we can say that the outlook we advocate gives good grounds 
to be wary of the symmetrical “vice versa” of (1), agrees with the gist of (2), 
and marshals tools which—when properly understood—allow (3) to appear 
less foreign from the standpoint of explicit understanding. 30 
 Prescission is a means of explanation which we can in turn explain—an un-
mysterious technical notion we can share amongst ourselves and apply with 
constancy. Alluding to this mode of distinction, Peirce wrote: “It may be no-
ticed that, throughout this process,  introspection is not resorted to. Nothing is 
assumed respecting the subjective elements of consciousness which cannot be 
securely inferred from the objective elements” (1992, pp. 3-4). Indeed, it 
should be emphasized that our discussion of the qualitative dimension of con-
sciousness relegated the (inescapable) frame of reference of lived experience 
to the background and at no point appealed to the idiosyncratic history of the 
reader in order to make its technical proposal intelligible and/or persuasive. 
The semiotic account of phenomenal qualia we have tendered would thus seem 
to meet the desideratum laid down by Dennett, who encouragingly stressed 
that “[t]he third-person approach is not antithetical to, or eager to ignore, the 
subjective nuances of experience; it simply insists on anchoring those subjec-
tive nuances to  something —anything, really—that can be detected and con-
fi rmed in replicable experiments” (2001, p. 231). 31 
 Semiotic inquiry can satisfy this because, as we have seen, it is patently  non-
Cartesian from the start. As Thomas Short explains: “[S]ince the human mind, 
according to Peirce, is constituted by semeiotic processes of a special type, it 
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should be possible to use the concept of semeiosis to analyze consciousness, 
and that precludes using the concept of consciousness to analyze semeiosis” 
(1986, p. 105). 
 7. Tentative excursus in ontology 
 We have described prescission as a distinction “less than real yet more than 
nominal.” That Scotist slogan, however, will not be very helpful if it is taken to 
entail some mid-way “subsistence” or other disingenuous “quasi-reality.” 
That’s why Peirce, in spite of his admiration, emphasized that for Duns Scotus’ 
logic to fruitfully contribute to a scientifi c worldview, it would have to be “torn 
away from its medievalism” and kept under guard by “continual wholesome 
reminders of nominalistic criticisms” (1931-58, vol. 1, para. 6). 32 In his well-
documented study of Peirce’s intellectual relation to Scotus, Boler ( 1963 , 
p. 102) suggests that Peirce objected to the notion of a dispositional “substan-
tial form”—perhaps the closest scholastic analogue to his qualitative “may-
being”—on account of its failure to elucidate the monadic structure (or lack 
thereof) involved. 
 In this sense, the framework we have urged, though largely continuous with 
a scholastic past, supplies a tangible advance. Centuries of semiotic refl ection 
have produced some hard-earned results which we can now distil to a handful 
of secure tenets. 33 Using the evocative terminology employed by Armstrong 
( 1989) , we know that representations necessarily have to be “layer-cakes” (and 
cannot be unitary “blobs”) on pain of no longer representing, and that this ir-
reducible complexity in turn allows us to prescind—i.e., distinguish without 
extinguishing—the constituents that make up a whole greater than its parts. 
Moreover (and this is of special importance to the “extended mind” conception 
in cognitive science), the previous holds true regardless of whether the triadic 
representation that pole-vaults on a qualitative vehicle to reach its object does 
so on the basis of a correlation that is subjective or objective, conventionally 
recognized or truly bound to its object. Yet the irreducibly triadic nature Peirce 
called attention to is not a blunt verdict about “what there is,” but a temperate 
conclusion about what any representation must be. Only with the additional 
premise of pansemiotism, the idea that everything is a sign (Nöth  1995 , p. 81), 
can such layering be read as a properly metaphysical thesis. And of course, that 
tendentious supplement can be resisted. 
 Thus, without countenancing anything overly dubious, the construal of rep-
resentation as a triadic relation of “standing for” (“ stare pro ”) nevertheless 
manages to show that there is a “glut”—to borrow a particularly apt term from 
multi-valued logic—between the extremes exemplifi ed by Block’s realism and 
Dennett’s instrumentalism. Minimally, we have to be able to wedge some sort 
of distinction in a sign to even realize that it isn’t its object—that the word 
“dog” doesn’t bite or that the smoke-from-the-fi re is also just plain smoke. 
Still, the partitioning of a sign’s three components is not the product of fi at, in 
spite of the fact that no quality is by itself signifi cant and that the meaning we 
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ascribe a vehicle can be wholly conventional (although it need not be). However 
one wants to describe all of this, Peirce was probably on the right track when he 
characterized semiotics as “the quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of signs” 
(1931-58, vol. 2, para. 227). 
 As was seen in the previous section, Peirce’s semiotic conception can help 
elucidate the intuitive appeal of many thought-experiments that are  pro- qualia. 
The proponent of phenomenal-consciousness may thus be inclined to think 
that prescission affords her a means of further articulating her thesis that con-
sciousness includes an irreducible qualitative dimension. As Frank Jackson 
insists, “Physicalism is not the noncontroversial thesis that the actual world is 
largely physical, but the challenging thesis that it is  entirely physical” ([1986] 
1997, p. 567; our emphasis). Accordingly, if it can be shown that the tone sim-
ply cannot be reduced to the token or the type, then this should lend appreciable 
support to the (for some, recondite) contention that there is “more” to con-
sciousness than purely physical occurrences. Despite having reprimanded the 
reifi cation that made this qualitative dimension some separate “thing” existing 
in its own right, it seems correct to say that we have vindicated Block to a cer-
tain extent by showing that, this important fl aw aside, he had a point after all. 
 Interestingly, prescission also lends credence to ontological outlooks which 
were more prosaic to begin with. In surveying various positions on the subject, 
Paul Churchland points out for example that “[t]he identity theorist can admit 
a duality, or even a plurality, of different  types of knowledge without thereby 
committing himself to a duality of  types of things known ” (1988, p. 34; see also 
[1989] 1997). This clearly harks back to the Scotist insight we have reiterated 
throughout this paper. But according to this interpretation, it should  silence —
not embolden—the phenomenal realist. All we have done is tell a convincing 
story about how we discern features, but since these are in fact bound together, 
our account gives us no grounds to think qualia in the typical sense exist in 
their own right. So it seems we have criticized Block; and indeed we have. 
 Unless one is prepared to hold the line that qualia are something  entirely 
distinct or the (equally improbable) view that there is absolutely  no way to 
even  notionally seize upon the qualitative dimension subsumed in a given rep-
resentation, then we think our semiotic account can be used pretty much to 
everyone’s benefi t. The categorial interrelations we outlined clearly allow 
those who initially countenanced qualia to continue doing so—albeit in a mod-
ifi ed, less provocative, way. On this reading, the type/token/tone trichotomy 
exonerates their chief contention.  Mutatis mutandis , theorists who didn’t coun-
tenance qualia can cite prescission to plausibly explain why the topic of qualia 
has captured with a remarkable consensus the inter-subjective attention of the-
orists. They can, that is, emphasize our critique of Block and read the glass so 
that it becomes half empty. 
 Granted, our declared goal was to tug at the  realist side of this dialectic so as 
to prevent the grasp of a qualitative dimension from turning on the hardboiled 
existence of some “thing” capable of being wholly independent. In keeping 
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with this critique, we have tried to show how prescission rescues sundry intu-
itions about conscious life from castigation without appealing to any kind of 
reifi cation. Nevertheless, a welcomed by-product of this amendment is that it 
makes the tone more palatable to the theorist who had rejected the queer ontol-
ogy standardly promulgated alongside phenomenal qualia. Taken together, we 
think these changes have the power to dislodge a long-standing clog in the fl ow 
of inquiry. 
 Conclusion 
 It is our considered belief that the notion of tone must recover its rightful place 
alongside the type and the token if contemporary thought is to consummate its 
aspiration of escaping the centripetal pull of Cartesian dualism. Although we 
could at best  invite a concerted rectifi cation of this neglect, we hope we have 
shown that resisting facile interpretations is not only sound from the standpoint 
of exegetic fi delity, it offers substantial philosophic benefi ts. For want of his-
torical sensitivity, however, philosophy butchered an important distinction 
which involved a rationale completely foreign to the canons of post-Latin dis-
course. Indeed, the vocabulary of the parties to the present controversy over 
qualia and Peirce’s triadic vocabulary do not easily match up. A crucial ques-
tion for the former debate is: should we quantify over qualia? Block (and Na-
gel) think that we should, Dennett (and others) that we should not. That 
discussion becomes totally warped when it is considered from the framework 
(in the Carnapian sense) of Peircean semiotics. And of course, that’s not a 
failing—it’s the whole point. 
 Pursuant with this aim (and our diagram), we have not proposed a solution 
to a problem as it stands. We have instead proposed a set of tools that allow us 
to rethink certain fundamental assumptions so that that problem does not sur-
face as it does in the fi rst place. Admittedly, the means elected to achieve this 
are in many ways deceptively humble. But like bending a tree in its infancy, it 
doesn’t require much if the positioning is right. 
 Upon having looked at what has been historically and what should be logi-
cally, we have previewed what could be; forecasting in a programmatic way 
the fruitful impact prescission can have on at least one aspect of the mind-body 
problem. If most of our theories have heretofore been unable to adequately 
fathom the phenomenal dimension proper to conscious life without running 
into all sorts of implausible consequences, perhaps this is because these theo-
ries have been trying to capture that object of study with a dichotomy funda-
mentally ill-suited to the task. So at any rate we argue. 
 This still leaves much work to be done. Given our concern with elucidating 
the problematic status of “phenomenal-consciousness,” we have confi ned our-
selves mainly to Firstness, and have disregarded—as one can in prescission—
the more developed categorial grades in contradistinction with which that 
qualitative dimension fi nds its meaning. As Peirce wrote: “Experience is the 
course of life. The world is that which experience inculcates. Quality is the 
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monadic element of the world.... But in saying this, we are straying from the 
domain of the monad into that of the dyad” (1931-58, vol. 1, para. 426). 34 In-
deed, we prescind from the fabric of representation elementary vehicles we do 
not (and would not want to) encounter in isolation. The tone may be a good fi t 
for P-consciousness, but it is by no means an explanatory panacea for con-
sciousness altogether. Accordingly, it is legitimate to try and elaborate a semi-
otic account of consciousness far less static than the one we have presented (see 
Champagne forthcoming a). That said, it would be a mistake to conceive such 
an approach as rival and not complementary—a warning-post wisely planted 
by Umberto Eco: “[T]he sign is the origin of the semiosic processes, and there 
is no opposition between the ‘nomadism’ of semiosis (and of interpretive activ-
ity) and the alleged stiffness and immobility of the sign” (1986, p. 1). 
 Just as nothing prevents us from folding our representational apparatus onto 
itself so as to inspect its incipient substructure, so can we scrutinize from the 
vantage point of the present the historical developments that have led us to 
where we are. Obviously, we could not exhaustively chart in a single article the 
landscape of possibilities which ensues when one decides to backtrack and 
incorporate the less heavy-handed method of prescission. But should the gist 
of our suspicions vis-à-vis the deep insuffi ciency of the type/token distinction 
prove correct, then adopting the complete trichotomy might go a long way to-
wards remedying some of the more stubborn problems that have beset contem-
porary inquiries into consciousness. A fi rst step down this promising avenue 
would be to connect with the notional framework that has come of age under 
semiotics’ trust. If we can narrow a disciplinary gap, maybe we can narrow an 
explanatory gap. 35 
 Notes 
  1  Many of the philosophical essays about consciousness we allude to have been an-
thologized (sometimes in augmented form) in Block, Flanagan, and Güzeldere 
( 1997) . For the sake of simplicity and accessibility, we have referred to this collec-
tion wherever possible (original sources are provided in the references). Similarly, 
in any instance where there was overlap, we have used the two  Essential Peirce 
volumes over the less-reliable  Collected Papers . 
  2  In many ways, McGinn’s pessimistic gloss places the “mind-body” problem within 
the larger context of global scepticism. However, the present contribution, which 
can be read as broadly naturalist in gait and destination, does not aspire to the prac-
tice of addressing the sceptic’s worries. 
  3  There are good reasons why we should be wary of such renunciation. As Nagel 
points out, “In discovering sound to be, in reality, a wave phenomenon in air or 
other media, we leave behind one viewpoint to take up another, and the auditory, 
human, or animal viewpoint that we leave behind remains unreduced” ([1974] 
1997, p. 523). 
  4  It can be argued that the most thoroughgoing form of externalism currently avail-
able in analytic philosophy of mind—“vehicle externalism” (Rowlands  2003 , 
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pp. 155-182)—already had a full theoretical treatment in Poinsot (see Deely  2001 ; 
as well as Rasmussen  1994 ). Unfortunately, that watershed contribution took place 
in what is arguably the least known strand in Western thought, namely scholastic 
philosophy after Descartes pretty much took historiography along with him. To ap-
preciate the extent of the neglect, we may note that although Blackwell’s recent 
 Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages states in no uncertain terms that “it is 
clear that both Augustine (b. 354; d. 430) and John of St. Thomas [a.k.a. Poinsot] 
(b. 1589; d. 1644) were engaged in the same intellectual program and therefore 
belong together” (Gracia and Noone  2006 , p. 1), the latter does not fi gure among 
the 138 entries (some of them about quite minor thinkers) that comprise the book. 
It is highly unlikely, however, that Poinsot’s  Tractatus —“a diffi cult work even for 
medievalists trained in late Latin Aristotelian thought” (Irvine  1988 , p. 707)—will 
be claimed by a similar “companion” to modernity. 
  5  It may be surprising to fi nd Augustine credited with inaugurating a model that will 
in time blossom into a sophisticated theory of representation. We may recall, for 
example, Wittgenstein’s paragraphs at the outset of the  Philosophical Investiga-
tions (not a work known for its historical scholarship) that depict Augustine as us-
ing names to merely “label” cognitively complete concepts. All the same, in 
Todorov’s estimate, Augustine “affi rms more strongly than earlier writers have 
done that words are merely one type of sign; this affi rmation, which stands out with 
increasing sharpness in his later writings, is the cornerstone of the semiotic per-
spective” (1992, p. 36; see also Eco and Marmo  1989 , pp. 4-5). It is important to 
keep in mind, however, that “[Augustine] introduced to the Latins and to philoso-
phy the sign as a theme, but he himself was never to thematize it” (Deely  2001 , 
p. 218). The covering model of the sign put forward in his pregnant refl ections will 
be discussed by a long succession of thinkers, like a silent undercurrent beneath 
the better-known disputes of medieval philosophy. 
  6  For details on the etymology and alternative spellings of the term, see Peirce (1998, 
p. 352). 
  7  These labels describe formal relations merely, and do not prejudge what might fi ll 
the placeholders. 
  8  John Deely is in all likelihood correct to suggest that seeing “[t]he greatest Ameri-
can philosopher disowning the most famous American development” in philosophy 
was (is?) for many “a considerable embarrassment” (2001, p. 616). Peirce’s griev-
ance with his previous pragmatist maxim, in a nutshell, was that the meaning of a 
sign is not determined by its immediate “practical bearings,” but by those it would 
have if interpreted in the long run. It is impossible, however, to make sense of this 
thesis without engaging in earnest with his semiotic doctrine, in particular his no-
tion of an “interpretant.” For his mature views on the subject—which he by then 
preferred to call “pragmaticism”—see Peirce (1998, pp. 331-433). 
  9  See his 1901 short text entitled “Triadomany,” which he subtitled “The author’s 
response to the anticipated suspicion that he attaches a superstitious or fanciful 
importance to the number three, and forces divisions to a Procrustean bed of tri-
chotomy” (Peirce  1931 -58, vol. 1, para. 568-572). 
174 Dialogue
  10  While he basically misappropriates the type/token/tone distinction and describes 
it as pertaining to “semantics,” Armstrong correctly insists that we are dealing 
here with “a perfectly general distinction applicable to any subject whatever” 
(1989, p. 1). Ironically, the generality of Peirce’s notions owes precisely to the 
fact that his project was  not semantic, in that semiotics is an all-encompassing 
enterprise which has nothing to do with the “glottocentrist” dogma that takes in-
tentionally emitted and conventionally coded expressions to be the paradigm ex-
emplars of the sign. For more on the assumptions that set language-centred 
approaches to the study of signs (like the “semiology” championed by Saussure) 
apart from semiotics proper, see Deledalle ( 2000 , pp. 100-113), as well as Deely 
( 2001 , pp. 669-688). 
  11  Peirce formulated the type/token/tone distinction under a variety of nomenclatures 
throughout his life. Moreover, the distinction itself is imbedded in a set of three 
trichotomies which together produce (not by multiplication) a tenfold semiotic de-
clension, cataloguing the modal steps by which representation passes from possi-
bility to actuality to generality. To fully understand the tone, one must apply 
prescission twice over. Strictly speaking, then, the tone is the First element of the 
sign (the sign-vehicle or “representamen”) considered in its Firstness as a not-yet-
occurrent quality (see Peirce 1998, pp. 289-299). For the record, we fi nd the less 
familiar terminology of “qualisign/sinsign/legisign” more conceptually appropri-
ate, and recognize that the full import of Peirce’s distinctions is best brought out 
when they collaborate as an interwoven whole. That said, in the interest of letting 
our historical- cum -logical restoration latch onto those terms that already enjoy 
wide currency, we have elected to stay with the better-known appellations. There is 
some exegetical justifi cation for this choice of terminology, since as late as Decem-
ber 1908 Peirce wrote in a letter to Lady Welby that “For a ‘possible’ Sign I have 
no better designation than a  Tone ” (1998, p. 480)—although he still juggled with 
alternative names. 
  12  If we avoid the fallacy of elevating the sign-vehicle into a suffi cient condition of 
representation, we see that the tone is emphatically  not a sign. “Phonemes, for ex-
ample, are not signs since they mean nothing” (Nöth  1995 , p. 80). To be sure, the 
tone is at the heart of any and all signs, since anything triadic perforce subsumes the 
dyadic and monadic. But it is a contradiction in terms to approach a quality as if it 
were alone in the universe yet maintain that it stands for something  else . Although 
this in no way means there is only one thing in the universe, it does show that a 
single quality would by itself be insuffi cient to re-present. 
  13  From a semiotic point of view, it makes no difference whether the regularity which 
governs the appearance of a set of tokens owes to natural laws or grammatical con-
ventions. 
  14  The  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ’s online entry on “Types and Tokens” 
(originally posted April 2006, consulted August 2008) alludes to  this very passage 
yet completely neglects to mention the tone, stating instead: “C. S. Peirce ( 1931 -58, 
sec. 4.537) called words in the fi rst sense ‘types’ and words in the second sense 
‘tokens’ ” (section 1.1). Much further down (in section 4.1.3), the entry avows that 
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“It wouldn’t do to ignore what the coiner of the type-token distinction had to say 
about types,” only to add immediately after that “Unfortunately it cannot be ade-
quately unpacked without an in-depth explication of Peirce’s semiotics, which can-
not be embarked upon here.” It is nevertheless remarked in passing: “(It should be 
mentioned that for Peirce there is actually a trichotomy among types, tokens and 
 tones , or qualisigns, which are ‘the mere quality of appearance’)” (ibid., parenthe-
ses in original; see Peirce  1931 -58, vol. 8, para. 334). Given that the entry is con-
cerned mainly with recapping the realism-nominalism debate in metaphysics, we 
fail to see why the traditional notions of “universal” and “particular” should have 
been clad in labels which—it is openly admitted—belong to a framework  foreign to 
that topic. 
  15  The proposal we are articulating is far more fundamental, and is logically anterior 
to the sociological- cum -cultural assumptions that are part and parcel of a linguistic 
approach. Such a limited construal appeared prominently in the analytic literature, 
for instance, with H. P. Grice’s introduction of “conversational tone.” Although 
Grice was aware of Peirce’s work, he ostensibly did not have a full sense of how 
semiotics involves a categorial matrix that has genuine repercussions for issues far 
outside the philosophy of language. Without this understanding, it could perhaps be 
feared that, to the degree one develops the idea of quality as tone, one is merely 
retreading an already familiar path. Yet for that to be the case, one would have fi rst 
to group linguistic items as a privileged class—the very dogma semiotics has 
sought to overcome since its inception. For a discussion of how Peirce’s mature 
writings “sketched a theory of natural language and communication, which offers a 
new perspective on the heavily debated Semantics-Pragmatics-Interface,” see Rellstab 
( 2008 ; especially part 3). 
  16  Although they often read more like rough personal notes, selected portions of 
Deledalle ( 2000 , pp. 5-20, 37-62, 67-75) provide a nice bridge from mainstream 
analytic philosophy to Peircean semiotics. For a more systematic exploration of the 
topic, we recommend Savan ( 1987) and Deely (1990). Peirce (1998) is a must 
(it should perhaps be unnecessary to say so, but let us note that, the above sources 
notwithstanding, mass-market introductory textbooks are generally no more reli-
able in semiotics than they are in philosophy when it comes to advanced technical 
issues—the type/token/tone distinction being a case in point). 
  17  Strictly speaking, Peirce was what we would today call a “panpsychist,” arguing 
that “matter is effete mind” (1931-58, vol. 6, para. 25). This stance in turn rests on 
the thesis that the universe is “perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively 
of signs” (Peirce 1998, p. 394; for recent support of this view in the philosophy of 
physics, see Ladyman, Ross, Spurrett, and Collier  2007 , pp. 210-220). That said, 
Peirce was fully aware of the problematic rifts that were starting to appear in the 
study of consciousness: “Matters of brain-physiology and matters of consciousness 
elbow one another in unsympathetic juxtaposition, in a way which can only be 
transitional, and is a sign for us, as well as we can look forward to conceptions not 
yet attained, that psychologists do not yet understand what mind is, nor what it 
does. I am not at all prepared to clear the matter up; but I dimly discern, I think, that 
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the physiological view has not suffi ciently affected the introspective aspect; and 
possibly the converse is true, also” (1931-58, vol. 2, para. 42). 
  18  Of course, the idea that standard reductionist/eliminativist accounts are not exhaus-
tive is tendentious. But if the “non-exhausted” party is dead wrong, then there is 
really no problem left for us to address, and our proposed reconceptualization can-
not even get off the ground. We shall therefore take due note of this profound dis-
sension and continue with the (in our assessment, correct) assumption that the 
perplexing realization that something is “left out” is not totally ill-founded. 
  19  Interestingly, the original coining cited Nagel’s paper as an infl uence (see Levine 
 1983 , p. 361 n. 3). 
  20  A notable proponent of this view, according to Block, would be Searle ( 1992 , pp. 
107-108), who argues that if epileptics in the grip of a seizure do not display any 
fl exibility and creativity in their behaviour, then we can conclude that fl exibility 
and creativity are important traits of consciousness. 
  21  For an overview of what is involved, see Bornstein and Pittman ( 1992) , Milner and 
Rugg (1992); as well as the more philosophical treatment in Nelkin ( 1996) . 
  22  The label is Block’s own (see his 2002). 
  23  For his part, Owen Flanagan believes this situation is more than a mere conceptual 
possibility, and that “the case of blindsight shows its actuality” ([1992] 1997, p. 371). 
  24  Block ( 2007) stresses the need to search for such a phenomenal module without expect-
ing the episodes enjoyed by a subject to be in any wise reportable. He argues that if we 
make reportability a non-negotiable desideratum of our explanation, we will see no 
need to investigate the qualitative experiences themselves. However, “access” in Block’s 
sense is thinner than a verbal report: “Reportability is a legacy of behaviorism that is less 
interesting than it has seemed. The more interesting issue in the vicinity is not the rela-
tion between the phenomenal and the reportable, but rather the relation between the 
phenomenal and the cognitively accessible” (2007, p. 484). So presumably, one could 
have access and still not be able to express this in any overt act of communication. 
  25  Although assorted empirical fi ndings are often quoted in support of various posi-
tions, the debate largely hinges on which party should assume the burden of (dis)
proof. Block ([1992] 1997) has explicitly accused theorists of harbouring a  petitio 
against phenomenal-consciousness, and has recently reiterated this claim in greater 
detail (2007). For a further discussion of Block’s stance and the inference he deems 
inconclusive, see Tye ( 1996 , pp. 291-295). 
  26  For one thing, it could be argued that Block does not fully appreciate the substantial 
point Dennett is trying to make when he asserts that the  ontology of consciousness 
is essentially cultural (to affi rm that we have cultural constructs for those things we 
talk about is a truism, and would make Dennett’s thesis a mere platitude). 
  27  For a handy survey of Dennett’s critical reception, see Dahlbom ( 1993) . 
  28  Block states that he does “not want to claim that there are non-representational 
phenomenal features of every experience or that when there are, these non-repre-
sentational features form support for the representational features in the manner of 
a ‘base’ ” (1995, p. 28). That is exactly what semiotics claims, the tone being the 
ultimate ground one can reach. Having said this, one must keep in mind that 
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“[w]hat is sign-vehicle one time can be signifi cate [i.e., object] another time; and 
what is interpretant one time can be sign-vehicle the next time; and so on, in an 
unending spiral of (as Peirce liked to say) abductions, deductions, and retroductions 
through which symbols grow” (Deely  2005 , p. 178). 
  29  Block has made his ontological commitments in this regard crystal clear: “Whether 
we use ‘consciousness’ or ‘phenomenal consciousness,’ ‘awareness’ or ‘access-
consciousness,’ the point is that there are two different concepts of the phenomenon 
or phenomena of interest. We have to acknowledge the possibility in principle that 
 these two concepts pick out different phenomena. Two vs. one: that is not a verbal 
issue ” (2000, p. 133; our emphasis). 
  30  Block compares the contribution of phenomena in conscious functions to that of 
water in a hydraulic machine ([1995] 1997, p. 379). This is a fair analogy, espe-
cially since any token perforce implies a tone. But prescission reminds us that water 
without hydraulic machinery would be just a puddle. Since such a lack of access 
would entail a tone without any token, talk of “qualia” in the plural would be inac-
curate: such a mind would be an unbounded expanse fi lled with a unique “what it’s 
like” that would literally be “I know not what.” We already have a name for such a 
“zombie”: we call it a vegetable (see Brandt 2007, pp. 61-62). 
  31  Tracts 2 and 3 in our diagram both agree that qualia are amenable to some sort of 
description and/or analysis. In light of this shared commitment, what sort of meth-
odological rigour can one expect? Although his ontological allegiances leave no 
room for ambiguity, Block’s own answer on this front is a qualifi ed optimism. While 
he thinks there is no reason to be embarrassed by the fact that no non-circular defi ni-
tion of phenomenal-consciousness can be formulated (Block [ 1995] 1997, p. 380), 
he has acknowledged that a realistic stance vis-à-vis this slippery aspect of con-
sciousness and an endorsement of scientifi c naturalism do not fi t comfortably to-
gether (see his 2002). That appraisal seems right. However, the semiotic framework 
we have offered as a substitute allows one to account for the fact that we can discern 
qualia—without making promises it cannot keep. Prescission suffi ces to establish 
that a tone is not a token. On this “quasi-logical” reading, one is not led to onerously 
postulate a separate “module” the actual presence of which researchers would 
 subsequently have to empirically vindicate. The researcher who seeks to confi rm 
that 1 + 1 = 2 by adding drops of water basically invites the objection that two drops 
joined yield but one; whereas the thinker who stays fi rmly grounded in the theoretical 
idiom best suited to the study of that truth wisely obviates such criticisms. 
  32  For instance, Duns Scotus defended the ideas of the Persian philosopher and Aris-
totelian commentator Ibn Sina (known to Latin Europe as “Avicenna”), who had 
argued that, though the human intellect groups concrete instances into various natural 
kinds, the “essence” which makes each individual item what it is must in some 
sense be  prior to its “existence” (see Williams  2003 , pp. 104-105; Jordan  1984 , 
pp. 143-147). In a way, this resembles Peirce’s contention that there is “no logical 
 diffi culty” in “supposing” a quality “without any occurrence” (1931-58, vol. 1, 
para. 304-305). An informative parallel can thus be drawn between the type/token/
tone distinction and the medieval tripartition of natures as  post rem ,  in rebus , and 
178 Dialogue
 ante rem (see Gracia and Noone  2006 , p. 199). As interesting as such a gloss is, how-
ever, it presents severe limitations one would do well to keep in mind. In a full-blown 
reifi cation that makes Block’s activated-but-inaccessible module pale by comparison, 
the idea of the  ante rem was usually taken as what the Divine Mind would be (was?) 
contemplating prior to the mysterious “contraction” of inchoate commonality into 
individualities; whereas from a (more humble) semiotic standpoint, the apprehension 
of the tone’s priority comes simply by way of a cognitive operation directed at a spe-
cifi c subclass of things (“signs”) which allow for such splitting to begin with. Accord-
ing to Peirce’s categorial architecture, representation entails relation and relation 
entails quality. But in establishing this, we always work our way down from a stock 
of representations, and thus never really encounter a quality that isn’t actualized. 
  33  A store of achievements nicely summarized in the otherwise eclectic Nöth ( 1995 , 
pp. 79-80). 
  34  This is certainly not unrelated to the celebrated “belief-doubt-inquiry-belief” sequence 
central to the pragmatist theory of knowledge (of which Peirce was indisputably a 
fountainhead). Pursuing this connection further, however, will force one to confront 
 normative questions downstream that, strictly speaking, fall outside the purview of 
semiotics and philosophy of mind. That’s not necessarily a bad thing; epistemology is 
a worthwhile endeavour. It’s just not something we set out to accomplish. 
  35  We would like to thank Verena Gottschling, Matthew Ivanowich, Ryan Tonkens, and 
anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier drafts (the usual caveats apply). We 
would also like to acknowledge the Department of Philosophy at York for its support. 
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